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Abstract
Development in many organisms appears to show evidence of sensitive windows—periods or stages in ontogeny
in which individual experience has a particularly strong influence on the phenotype (compared to other periods or
stages). Despite great interest in sensitive windows from both fundamental and applied perspectives, the
functional (adaptive) reasons why they have evolved are unclear. Here we outline a conceptual framework for
understanding when natural selection should favour changes in plasticity across development. Our approach builds
on previous theory on the evolution of phenotypic plasticity, which relates individual and population differences in
plasticity to two factors: the degree of uncertainty about the environmental conditions and the extent to which
experiences during development (‘cues’) provide information about those conditions. We argue that systematic
variation in these two factors often occurs within the lifetime of a single individual, which will select for
developmental changes in plasticity. Of central importance is how informational properties of the environment
interact with the life history of the organism. Phenotypes may be more or less sensitive to environmental cues at
different points in development because of systematic changes in (i) the frequency of cues, (ii) the informativeness
of cues, (iii) the fitness benefits of information and/or (iv) the constraints on plasticity. In relatively stable
environments, a sensible null expectation is that plasticity will gradually decline with age as the developing
individual gathers information. We review recent models on the evolution of developmental changes in plasticity
and explain how they fit into our conceptual framework. Our aim is to encourage an adaptive perspective on
sensitive windows in development.
Introduction
Phenotypes result from an interaction between evolu-
tionary and developmental processes of adaptation: trait
expression is adjusted during development in response
to information about the environment, via molecular,
physiological and psychological mechanisms that have
evolved through natural selection [1,2]. This adaptive
developmental plasticity often varies across the lifespan,
punctuated by one or more sensitive windows (see glos-
sary, Table 1) during which the phenotype is particularly
responsive to environmental conditions. For example,
social interactions early in life can have pronounced and
lasting effects on behaviour [3-5], as highlighted by the
pioneering studies on filial and sexual imprinting by
ethologists such as Lorenz [6], Immelmann [7] and
Bateson [8]. More recent work has identified adoles-
cence as another sensitive developmental phase in many
species for adapting to the social environment [9-18]
(but see [19]), perhaps foreshadowed in humans by a
developmental switch point in middle childhood [20].
Yet despite broad interest in these patterns, we lack a
general understanding of why, from an evolutionary per-
spective, such sensitive windows in development exist.
To help address this problem, here we outline an adap-
tive framework for understanding when natural selection
should favour changes in plasticity across development.
We define plasticity as the degree to which cues received
during development affect an organism’s phenotype. This
broad definition encompasses activational plasticity (an
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immediate phenotypic change in response to current
cues; also termed contextual plasticity) as well as narrow-
sense developmental plasticity (a lasting phenotypic
change in response to cues received in the past) [21-23],
both of which should be sculpted by the same fundamen-
tal selective pressures we identify below. Note that we are
interested specifically in evolved patterns of plasticity (i.e.
potential plasticity rather than realised plasticity [23]).
We focus primarily on the development of social beha-
viour—that is, interactions with other (conspecific) indi-
viduals—but many of the points we make are equally
applicable to other phenotypic traits.
To set the stage for our framework, we briefly discuss
uncertainty about environmental conditions and informa-
tiveness of cues during development (Fig. 1) as the major
factors that drive plasticity differences between popula-
tions and between individuals in the same population. We
then connect this work to patterns of development, by
showing how the same perspective can be used to study
adaptive variation in plasticity within the lifetime of a sin-
gle individual. The key point we wish to make is that to
understand adaptive developmental plasticity, we need to
consider how informational properties of the environment
interact with the life history of the organism [24]. Our aim
is to stimulate an evolutionary, fitness-based approach to
the study of sensitive windows in development.
Table 1 Glossary of technical terms used in this article
Term Definition
Autocorrelation A statistical association between environmental states across space or time. Positive temporal autocorrelation implies
that conditions at one point in time are similar to those in the near future.
Bayesian updating A method for revising a belief about the world in the light of new evidence, based on Bayes’s rule. See Appendix A
(additional file 1) for more details.
Estimate A probability distribution for possible states of the world, based on the information available to an individual from its
past experiences and evolutionary history. Note that no cognitive process, conscious or otherwise, is implied.
Cue An experience that potentially provides information about environmental conditions. Note that cues can be
uninformative, unreliable or even misleading (cf. information, which by definition is always informative).
Information A reduction in uncertainty (about the state of the world).
Informativeness The extent to which a cue reduces uncertainty.
Mutual information The amount by which uncertainty is reduced (by observation of a new cue).
Plasticity The degree to which cues received during development affect an organism’s phenotype. Here we include both
activational (or contextual) plasticity, whereby the organism immediately adjusts its phenotype in response to current
cues, and narrow-sense developmental plasticity, in which there is a lasting phenotypic response to cues received in
the past [21-23].
Posterior In Bayesian updating, a revised estimate of the state of the world after new evidence has been taken into account.
Prior In Bayesian updating, an initial estimate of the state of the world before new evidence is taken into account.
Reliability The extent to which a cue indicates the true state of the world (either now or in the future).
Sensitive window A developmental period or stage in which experience shapes phenotypic development to a larger extent than in
other periods or stages. This definition encompasses both sensitive periods—in which plasticity is a function of
chronological age—and sensitive stages—in which plasticity is not tied to a specific age but is a function of the
organism’s developmental stage, which can depend on its previous experiences (e.g. the duration of a sensitive
window might depend on the consistency of experiences earlier in development [35]).
Uncertainty The probabilistic nature of an organism’s knowledge about the world, determined by factors beyond its immediate
control but potentially reducible by sampling [94].
Value of information The change in expected future reproductive success associated with a reduction in uncertainty. Note that this is
always non-negative: information, once received, never reduces fitness [41].
Figure 1 Selection for fixed versus plastic phenotypes. This
schematic representation (inspired by [28,30]) shows how evolved
plasticity should depend on uncertainty about environmental
conditions and the informativeness of cues received during
development. Plasticity (dark shading) is favoured when high
uncertainty about environmental conditions is combined with cues
that are highly informative about those conditions; otherwise, a fixed
phenotype is favoured. Note that both of these factors (uncertainty
about conditions and informativeness of cues) may change during
ontogeny. For example, uncertainty will tend to decrease over
development (as indicated by the white block arrows), particularly if
the cues received are highly informative; this will weaken the benefits
of plasticity later in life (all else being equal).
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Adaptive explanations for variation in plasticity between
and within populations
‘Darwinian demons’ , which can maximise all aspects of
fitness simultaneously [25] and develop optimal pheno-
types in all environmental conditions at any life stage
[26], are rare or non-existent in nature. Organisms do
typically tailor their phenotype to local environmental
conditions [27], but the extent to which they do so var-
ies between populations, within populations and within
individuals over time. What ecological factors underlie
this variation in plasticity?
Variation in plasticity between populations
Natural selection favours plasticity if organisms are
uncertain about the present or future environmental
conditions, and cues received during development pro-
vide information (i.e. reduce uncertainty) about those
conditions [28,30] (Fig. 1). Organisms face uncertainty if
environmental conditions fluctuate, in a stochastic man-
ner, on timescales too fast for genetic evolution to track.
If, alternatively, conditions are constant or change very
slowly relative to the generation time, or if changes
follow a highly regular pattern across the organism’s
lifespan (e.g. all individuals are born in the spring and
reproduce in the autumn, when conditions are differ-
ent), then organisms should evolve fixed phenotypes sui-
ted to those conditions (‘adaptive tracking’ by genetic
evolution [30]). A study by Carroll and Corneli [31] on
soapberry bugs (Jadera haematoloma) illustrates that
selection for plasticity depends on the stochastic varia-
bility of environmental conditions over evolutionary
time. In Oklahoma, where sex ratios are stochastically
variable across generations (due to climatic fluctuations),
males are plastic, calibrating the amount of mate guard-
ing they perform to the sex ratio they have experienced
in their own lifetime. By contrast, in Florida, where sex
ratios are more stable, males engage in a fixed amount
of mate guarding and, when exposed to variable sex
ratios in the laboratory, are incapable of calibrating [31].
Thus plasticity has only evolved in those populations
that are naturally exposed to stochastic variation in the
sex ratio, such that individuals are born uncertain about
the intensity of competition for mates.
Uncertainty does not by itself select for plasticity. For
plasticity to be favoured, cues received during develop-
ment must provide information about the present or
future environmental conditions (Fig. 1) [29]. In Okla-
homa soapberry bugs [31], for example, plasticity in
mate-guarding behaviour is adaptive because the num-
ber of males and females an individual encounters pro-
vides information about the local sex ratio, and hence
the competition for mates. Organisms may use cues
during development to infer the present conditions, and
if environmental states are highly autocorrelated over
time then they might use those cues to predict future
conditions as well [32,33]. If organisms cannot anticipate
the environmental conditions due to lack of information
about the present, weak autocorrelation with the future,
or both, then natural selection might favour bet-hedging
instead of plasticity [30,34].
Variation in plasticity within populations
Plasticity varies not only between populations (e.g. [31])
but also between individuals in the same population
[35-37]. From an adaptive perspective, such differences
may again be related to uncertainty about environmental
conditions.
Between-individual differences may be fixed from
birth or gradually emerge due to variation in early
experience. Considering fixed differences, models have
shown that stable between-individual variation in plasti-
city can be maintained in a single population through
negative frequency-dependent selection [38] or parental
bet-hedging [34]. Wolf et al. [38] modelled a scenario in
which individuals living in an uncertain environment
were either ‘responsive’ , in that they could assess (at a
cost) the environmental conditions and adjust their
behaviour accordingly, or ‘unresponsive’ , in which case
they adopted the same behavioural strategy regardless of
current conditions. At equilibrium the population com-
prised a mixture of responsive and unresponsive types,
because the pay-off to each type was inversely related to
its relative frequency (see also [39]). Using similar logic,
Frankenhuis et al. [34] modelled offspring production in
a stochastically varying environment. Parents could
choose to invest in either plastic (‘generalist’ ) offspring
that could adjust (at a cost) their phenotype to match
current conditions, fixed (‘specialist’ ) offspring that
were inflexible and only gained a high fitness pay-off if
the current conditions happened (by chance) to match
their predetermined phenotype, or a mixture of the two
types. Given large fitness effects, greater costs of being
mismatched than benefits of being well-matched and a
temporally fluctuating environment in which conditions
could change from one generation to the next, the most
successful strategy was a form of diversified bet-hedging
in which parents produced a mixture of plastic and
fixed offspring [34].
Rather than being an intrinsic, stable characteristic
fixed from birth, an individual’s degree of plasticity
could also be contingent on its early experience. Indivi-
duals that received a highly consistent set of cues early
in life may later show reduced plasticity compared to
those that received contradictory cues, because the latter
remain more uncertain about current conditions and
hence delay phenotypic commitments [35,36]; in such a
case, the duration of a sensitive window is itself plastic.
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We return to this point below when discussing endo-
genous changes in information state.
Adaptive explanations for variation in plasticity within
the lifetime of a single individual
The above perspective suggests that phenotypic plasticity
can be understood as an adaptive response to environ-
ments in which conditions are uncertain and cues received
during development provide information about those con-
ditions [28,30]. Building on this insight, our aim is to iden-
tify evolutionary reasons why phenotypes may be more or
less plastic in different phases of development. We are
specifically interested in situations where natural selection
has generated changes in plasticity over the course of
development, such that the same experience has differing
phenotypic effects depending on the developmental period
or stage at which it occurs. Central to our approach is the
distinction between information—a reduction in uncer-
tainty—and cues, the events during development that
(potentially) provide the information [40,41].
From an adaptive perspective, changes in plasticity over
the course of development reflect changes in the costs
and/or benefits of being plastic, where costs and benefits
are defined in terms of decreases and increases in
expected future reproductive success. Here we identify
four non-mutually-exclusive reasons why this might be
the case, drawing on the distinction between cues and
information. Selection will tend to favour changes in
plasticity if there is systematic (i.e. partly predictable) var-
iation across development in (i) the frequency of cues,
(ii) the informativeness of cues, (iii) the fitness benefits of
information and/or (iv) the constraints on plasticity. Of
critical importance is how such variation coincides with
particular phases of the organism’s development, as
determined by its life history. Below we discuss each of
these factors in turn.
(i) Variation in the frequency of cues
The benefits of plasticity will change across development
if, within lifetimes, there is systematic variation in the fre-
quency of cues received by the organism that indicate the
conditions relevant to that particular aspect of the phe-
notype. This frequency may vary because of changes in
sampling (e.g. exploration), which is often an active pro-
cess that is itself under selection [35,42], or because of
changes in the availability of cues in the external environ-
ment. Assuming that processing of cues is not cost-free
(see (iv) below), we would expect evolved patterns of
developmental plasticity to anticipate this variation: indi-
viduals should show reduced plasticity during phases of
development when cues are usually rare and heightened
plasticity when cues are most frequent, all else (e.g. cue
informativeness—see (ii) below) being equal.
Thus, if individuals are likely to encounter a new
source of cues in particular phases of development, we
would expect to observe an associated increase in plasti-
city. New cues may become available because individuals
begin interacting with a completely new set of partners,
for example after dispersal to a different social group.
Early experiences in this new situation may have a for-
mative impact on the phenotype. Alternatively, the
interaction partners may stay the same but the nature of
those interactions may change; for example, interactions
with opposite-sex peers before puberty may provide very
different cues (e.g. relating to social alliances or friend-
ships) from interactions with those same peers after
puberty (e.g. indicating potential reproductive opportu-
nities). A third possibility is that both the type of social
interactions and the interaction partners change simul-
taneously. In many species, independence from parents
is marked by a shift from predominantly asymmetrical
interactions with those parents to more symmetrical
interactions with similar-aged peers, which may be one
explanation why adolescence could be a sensitive phase
for the development of social behaviour [16,43].
If the timing of such changes in an organism’s social
situation is variable, associated increases in plasticity
need not be tied to specific time periods in develop-
ment. Instead, selection may favour heightened plasticity
when individuals are exposed to novel social situations
and thus encounter new cues, regardless of the period
of development in which this occurs. In species with
very labile social systems, a high degree of plasticity may
need to be maintained throughout life. For example, in
the cichlid fish Astatotilapia burtoni, which has a highly
dynamic social structure, males of all ages show striking
changes in behaviour and reproductive physiology
within minutes of a change in the composition of their
social group [44,45].
(ii) Variation in the informativeness of cues
Even if cue frequency is constant throughout develop-
ment, there may be variation in the informativeness of
those cues, in terms of how much they reduce the recei-
ver’s uncertainty. This uncertainty reduction is what
information theorists refer to as mutual information;
note that it is distinct from the usefulness (e.g. fitness
value; see (iii) below) of that information [41,46,47].
Systematic variation across development in cue informa-
tiveness could arise from exogenous or endogenous
factors.
Exogenous changes in cue reliability. Cue reliability
[23,28,48] (sometimes termed validity [35])—the extent
to which cues reflect the true conditions—may change
across development in a predictable way; this is an exo-
genous factor in the sense that it is not caused by
changes in the organism perceiving those cues. If the
environment is variable and autocorrelated over time,
then cues indicating a situation that will be experienced
in the future will typically be more reliable closer to
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that point in time [32]. For example, cues indicating the
intensity of mating competition an individual can expect
to face as an adult will tend to be more reliable in late
adolescence than in early childhood. This may promote
heightened plasticity as sexual maturity approaches.
Very early in development much of the available infor-
mation is transgenerational, which has interesting impli-
cations for cue reliability. Maternally derived cues in the
prenatal environment may more reliably predict future
external conditions than those experienced directly by
the offspring after birth or hatching, because the mother’s
greater exposure to external conditions provides a more
informative cue. From this perspective, the mother is
viewed as an experienced integrator of cues who can
filter out useful information from background noise
[49,50], which may partly explain why the prenatal envir-
onment has such a lasting impact on development in
many species [5,51-56]. On the other hand, the need for
the mother to provide a protective environment, which
buffers her developing offspring against more variable
and potentially damaging conditions in the external
environment [57], may limit the informativeness of con-
ditions in utero. A recent meta-analysis of experimental
studies revealed limited evidence that transgenerational
plasticity confers fitness benefits on offspring [58], per-
haps because of weak correlations between parent and
offspring environments [29].
The reliability of maternal cues in forecasting future
conditions for offspring is strongly dependent on the
species’ ecology and life history. Maternal cues may be
informative either because adults and offspring occupy
similar ecological niches, or because the mother’s own
experiences as a juvenile reliably predict her offspring’s
juvenile environment. In the cichlid Simochromis pleur-
ospilus, juveniles and adults occupy different habitats
with associated differences in food availability and pre-
dation risk, which render the mother’s adult environ-
ment a poor predictor of the conditions her offspring
will experience when they reach independence [59,60].
Consequently, mothers tailor their investment in eggs in
response to the food availability they themselves experi-
enced as juveniles [59], whereas maternal effects on
antipredator behaviour are quickly overridden by the
offspring’s own experiences [60].
In general, the benefits of plasticity will be affected by
how reliably current cues predict environmental condi-
tions at the target life stage(s) at which selection acts.
Correlation between current and future conditions is
thus critical. Correlograms—plots of the temporal auto-
correlation over different time lags—can be a useful tool
in certain study systems for assessing the predictability
of conditions across development [29].
Endogenous changes in information state. Endogen-
ous factors reflect how information is accumulated over
the course of development. Even when confronted with
equally reliable cues, individuals at different develop-
mental stages will often differ in their uncertainty about
environmental conditions, leading to different levels of
sensitivity to new information. Typically, older indivi-
duals will have been exposed to more cues than younger
individuals and so, providing those cues were informa-
tive, they will have lower uncertainty about the true
state of the world. This implies that they will be less
influenced by new cues than are individuals at earlier
stages of development.
We can use a Bayesian approach (see Appendix A,
additional file 1) to examine how sensitivity to new cues
should change as individuals become better informed
over the course of development. We first discuss a case
where environmental conditions remain constant
throughout development, before considering a situation
in which conditions vary, with some degree of predict-
ability, across ontogeny. For illustrative purposes, con-
sider a simplified scenario in which an individual is
uncertain which of two situations it faces, but the
appropriate behaviour differs between the two situations.
For example, continuing with the soapberry bug exam-
ple mentioned above [31], a male might not know
whether the competition for mates is high or low, but
mate guarding is only adaptive in the former situation.
We can conceptualise the male’s current estimate (at
time t) regarding its social circumstances as a probabil-
ity pt, with pt = 0 representing certainty about one situa-
tion (e.g. that there is low competition for mates, due to
an excess of females in the adult population) and pt = 1
representing certainty about the alternative situation
(e.g. that there is high competition for mates, due to an
excess of males in the adult population). Uncertainty is
greatest at pt = 0.5, where the male estimates (non-con-
sciously) that both situations are equally likely. Note
that when discussing what an individual ‘estimates’ or
‘knows’, we are not referring to any particular cognitive
processes; this is merely a convenient shorthand to cap-
ture the information available to the individual, based
on a combination of its past experiences and evolution-
ary history. In general, we expect that natural selection
will have produced animals that behave as if they knew
the probabilities associated with different situations
[61,62].
Now imagine that, during development, the individual
receives a steady stream of information about its cir-
cumstances (Fig. 2). Specifically, we assume that new
cues are detected at a constant rate, so there is no varia-
tion in cue frequency (see (i) above), and that all cues
are equally reliable, so we can also rule out exogenous
variation in cue informativeness (see above, this section).
In our example, this corresponds to the male soapberry
bug encountering adult conspecifics at a constant rate,
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and having a fixed ability to detect their sex. If, at the
start of development (t = 0), the individual estimates the
two situations to be equally likely (i.e. it has a uniform
prior, p0 = 0.5), then cues received early in the sequence
will reduce its uncertainty to a greater extent (in other
words, will be more informative) than those received
later on (Fig. 2, red line). This is because at later stages
in development the individual has received more infor-
mation, and so has greater certainty about which parti-
cular situation it faces. The same applies when the
information it receives during development is congruent
with (and thus strengthens) its initial estimate about
which situation is more likely (Fig. 2, blue line).
A different pattern of sensitivity arises if information
received during development contradicts the initial esti-
mate; that is, if developmental experiences cause pt to
increase from an initial estimate of p0< 0.5 (as shown in
Fig. 2, grey line), or equivalently if they cause pt to
decrease from p0> 0.5. In this case, the extent to which
new cues affect the current estimate rises and then falls
over the course of development, such that the period of
greatest sensitivity occurs at an intermediate age. In
general, peak sensitivity to new information coincides
with the point in development when uncertainty is
greatest, i.e. when the probabilities of the different possi-
ble states of the world are most similar (in this simple
case of two alternative states, pt = 1 − pt = 0.5). In most
cases this will be at the start of development, but as the
‘incongruent’ case shows (Fig. 2, grey line), it is theoreti-
cally possible, at least in a scenario with only two possi-
ble states of the world, for uncertainty to be greatest
later in development.
What determines the initial estimate (p0)? This could
represent inherited genetic information, reflecting the
relative exposure of the focal individual’s ancestors to
different types of conditions in the past [61], or perhaps
non-genetic parental effects, such as maternal effects set
by the specific experiences of the focal individual’s
mother [63]. Typically (unless conditions have changed
suddenly and unpredictably) this prior information will
be an accurate estimate of the likelihood of each possi-
ble situation the individual might face, otherwise the
organism should have evolved to ignore it. Therefore,
the prior information is likely to be congruent with cues
received subsequently during development. This is one
reason why developmental experiences that occur early
in life will—all else being equal—tend to have the most
powerful impact on the phenotype. Thus, when consid-
ering developmental changes in plasticity, a sensible null
expectation is not that plasticity remains constant, but
that it declines with age. We might therefore predict
that the rate of change in behaviour is higher earlier in
ontogeny and that individuals should show greater con-
sistency in their behaviour as they mature and gain
Figure 2 Developmental changes in information state when conditions are stable. The upper panel shows the optimal estimate (pt) of the
environmental state in response to a steady stream of information (from cues of fixed reliability), calculated using Bayesian updating (Appendix
A, additional file 1). The lower panel shows the extent to which the estimate changes (Δpt) when a new cue is observed. The three different
lines depict the estimates for individuals in three cases, depending on whether the initial estimate is a uniform prior (i.e. both states are equally
likely), is in agreement with subsequent cues (‘congruent’) or is contradicted by subsequent cues (‘incongruent’ ). Note that sensitivity to
environmental cues declines with time, unless the observed cues contradict the initial estimate. See text for more details.
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experience [48], a pattern for which there is some
empirical evidence [48,64,65]. This declining sensitivity
to environmental cues over the course of development
neatly parallels the evolutionary prediction that reduced
uncertainty favours a less plastic phenotype [28,30,66],
as indicated in Fig. 1.
So far, for illustrative purposes, we have considered a
highly simplified scenario in which there are only two
possible states of the world. In reality, the relevant
environmental conditions will often show continuous
variation, or at least a large number of possible states—
for example, the optimal level of mate-guarding beha-
viour might depend not merely on whether adult males
outnumber adult females, but on the precise sex ratio.
This alters the dynamics of information, because unlike
in a two-state scenario the organism’s current estimate
of the environment and its uncertainty regarding that
estimate can change independently (see Appendix A,
additional file 1). A recent model by Stamps and Krish-
nan [48] considered a large number of possible states,
rather than just two, to investigate how developmental
trajectories differ when individuals with different initial
estimates are given the same set of cues. Their model
predicted that the change in uncertainty is always great-
est at the start of development regardless of the initial
estimate, even if subsequent cues contradict that esti-
mate. Thus, the expected decline in plasticity over onto-
geny may be a more robust prediction than a simple
two-state model suggests. A delayed peak in plasticity
(grey line, Fig. 2) is possible in principle, but it appears
to occur only in the two-state model, and then only in
the unlikely case that the cues received during develop-
ment contradict the organism’s initial estimate.
There is an important caveat to these predictions.
Although the optimal phenotype should reflect the ani-
mal’s underlying information state [48,62,67], this phe-
notype might be biased towards situations associated
with higher fitness returns [68]. Consider aggression in
the face of uncertainty; an individual may not know
whether it is stronger or weaker than its rivals, but this
information is important for adopting an appropriate
level of aggressive behaviour [35,36,69]. If the fitness
returns (when following the optimal strategy) are much
higher for an individual who is stronger than its rivals
than one who is weaker than its rivals, it pays to start
out behaving as if the former is true, even if this is sta-
tistically unlikely to be the case [69]. Such a phenotypic
bias can cause a lag between the (unobservable) change
in information state and the (observable) change in
behaviour, leading to a delay in the period of peak plas-
ticity. Only in cases where similar fitness can be
achieved under all environmental conditions would we
expect a direct correspondence between changes in
information state and observable phenotypic changes.
The above logic applies to cases in which conditions
are reasonably stable across ontogeny. Trajectories of
plasticity may be different if conditions can change dur-
ing development [26]. Rather than showing a gradual
decline, uncertainty may suddenly increase when indivi-
duals are faced with a new social situation, because of
ecological factors (e.g. dispersal to a new social group)
or physical development (e.g. rapid increase in muscu-
larity). For example, periods of physical development
that are highly variable between individuals in their
extent or timing may generate renewed uncertainty
about relative strength part way through development,
leading to a second phase of heightened sensitivity to
new social experiences (Fig. 3). The adolescent growth
spurt in humans may have this kind of effect.
In the most dynamic social systems, it may be advanta-
geous to retain a high degree of plasticity throughout life.
This appears to be the case for the cichlid A. burtoni, in
which reversals of social dominance between males can
happen at any time [70-72]. Dominant males are not only
more vulnerable to predation (because of their greater
conspicuousness) but also grow more slowly than subor-
dinates, so ‘overtaking’ in growth is common [72]. This
makes the dominance hierarchy unstable, promoting
high plasticity throughout life in this species [44,45]
because uncertainty about future conditions remains
high. Interestingly, brain and hormonal changes occur
more rapidly in males ascending the hierarchy than des-
cending it [73], a bias that may be favoured by the fitness
asymmetry between breeding and non-breeding positions
(i.e. reproductive skew).
Within a population, individual differences in plasticity
may emerge in relation to the consistency of cue sets
received earlier in development, because of how this
affects information state. Uncertainty about the future
environmental state will typically be greater for indivi-
duals that experience stochastically changing conditions
than those that experience stable conditions [26]. Thus,
if maintaining plasticity is costly [74,75], individuals that
have had highly variable experiences early in life should
retain a greater degree of plasticity than those exposed
to relatively stable conditions [36]. In effect, the pattern
of plasticity may itself be plastic.
This phenomenon is well established for sensory sys-
tems: individuals experiencing a transient shift in their
sensory environment show greater neuronal plasticity
when the same experience is repeated later in life, com-
pared to those experiencing the change for the first time
[76,77]. At a behavioural level, Kotrschal and Taborsky
[78] showed that in S. pleurospilus, a mouth brooding
cichlid, adults perform better in an associative learning
task if they experienced a change in food availability as
juveniles, regardless of the direction of the change
(increase or decrease). In this setting, experiences early
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in life appear to be used as a source of information
about the temporal stability of environmental
conditions.
Uncertainty about environmental conditions will also
be greater for individuals that receive noisy or error-
prone cues, which again may promote plasticity
[35,36,79]. For example, auditory specialisation in rats
(Rattus norvegicus) reared with a continuous background
of moderate-intensity white noise is delayed well beyond
the critical window observed for rats reared under stan-
dard laboratory conditions [80]. The same principle
should apply to noisy internal neural signals as well as
noisy external environmental cues. An interesting possi-
bility is that humans suffering from certain developmen-
tal disorders, such as autism spectrum disorder, prolong
plasticity as an adaptive response to atypically high levels
of error in neurally encoded information [79]. Although
the noisy neural signals associated with autism are them-
selves probably maladaptive (in evolutionary terms),
keeping sensitive windows open for longer may represent
the best way of coping with this impaired state.
It should be clear from the various scenarios discussed
above that an individual’s response to new information is
strongly dependent on its prior information state, which
can generate a variety of patterns of plasticity across
development. The essential point we wish to make is
that, even with no changes in the frequency or reliability
of cues, it is inevitable that cue informativeness will vary
across development, so we should not expect individuals
to be equally plastic at all ages or developmental stages.
In social environments that are reasonably stable within
an individual’s lifetime, our null expectation should be
that, all else being equal, plasticity declines across
development.
(iii) Variation in the fitness benefits of information
Even controlling for variation in the frequency and infor-
mativeness of cues, there may be additional variation in
the fitness benefits of information received across devel-
opment—that is, the same amount of information may
be more or less valuable at different stages of life. Once
acquired, information never reduces fitness [41]. How-
ever, given the same amount of information (i.e. the
same reduction in uncertainty), the increase in expected
future reproductive success from making phenotypic
adjustments in response to this information often varies
across development. One general point is that phenotypic
adjustments late in life will typically have a lower impact
on fitness than those early in life, because fewer indivi-
duals survive to older ages and thus the force of selection
declines with age [81-83].
In specific contexts there may be additional sources of
variation in the fitness benefits of plasticity, depending on
the ecological and life-history characteristics relevant to
that aspect of the phenotype. For example, in the context
of mutual mate choice, it is adaptive for individuals to
modify their choice strategy in response to social feed-
back about their own attractiveness [84,85]. However,
individuals approaching the end of their reproductive life-
span will gain relatively little benefit from adjusting their
mate-choice behaviour and so should be less sensitive to
Figure 3 Developmental changes in information state when conditions change. As for Fig. 2, except that uncertainty increases mid-way
through development because individuals encounter a new social situation. For clarity, only the trajectory with the uniform prior is shown. See
text for more details.
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social feedback than those with most of their reproduc-
tion still ahead of them. Individuals might also differ in
sensitivity to social feedback depending on their current
relationship status (e.g. whether they are settled in a
long-term relationship, are considering ending such a
relationship, or are single). Taking filial imprinting as
another example, there are likely to be strong benefits of
following a familiar stimulus (i.e. the parent) around
when an individual is small, naïve and vulnerable to pre-
dation [8], but much less so when it is bigger, experi-
enced and able to defend itself.
(iv) Variation in the constraints on plasticity
If there were no constraints on plasticity then indivi-
duals should evolve to be maximally plastic all the time
[74], even if cues are sparse or barely informative. To
understand patterns of adaptive developmental plasticity,
we therefore need to consider the constraints as well as
the potential benefits [41].
DeWitt et al. [74] distinguished between two broad
classes of constraint: limits and costs (but see [86]).
Plasticity is limited if plastic development cannot
achieve the same range of phenotypes as fixed modes of
development. For example, the time or resources
required for phenotypic adjustments may mean that the
range of possible phenotypes is more restricted as devel-
opment progresses, making it increasingly difficult to
switch to an alternative developmental trajectory
[35,36,53,87,88]. The limits could also vary across devel-
opment if there are particular periods in which plasticity
trades off with other traits that are important at the
same life stage. For instance, plasticity genes could have
detrimental pleiotropic effects on traits other than the
focal plastic trait, and these effects might be stronger in
some life stages (e.g. during organogenesis) than others
[74]. Accordingly, even if the frequency and informative-
ness of cues remains constant, the ability to use that
information may vary across ontogeny.
Plasticity is costly if a plastic individual can produce
the same phenotype as one with a fixed developmental
pattern, but by doing so it has lower fitness [75,86].
Here we briefly mention three main types of cost (see
also [74,75]):
1. Start-up costs: the energy and/or resources to build
and maintain the neural-cognitive machinery required
for plasticity. For example, in selected lines of Drosophila,
larvae of flies with higher learning ability showed reduced
survival under competition, demonstrating a fitness cost
of this aspect of plasticity [89].
2. Running costs: the energy and/or resources to
obtain information and process phenotypic changes.
Note that these costs are only paid when the machinery
for plasticity is actually used, distinguishing them from
start-up costs (see 1 above). Evidence for running costs
also comes from studies of Drosophila: the formation
and maintenance of long-term memory appears to
reduce resistance to starvation and desiccation in adult
flies [90].
3. Error costs: the fitness costs of ‘getting it wrong’ .
Individuals might develop an inappropriate phenotype if
they misperceive reliable cues, if they accurately perceive
cues but incorrectly execute actions, or if they respond to
irrelevant cues as though they were informative. As an
example of the latter, consider sexual imprinting in obli-
gate brood parasites [91]. The machinery for sexual
imprinting should be actively switched off while the para-
site offspring is still in the host nest, otherwise it will end
up imprinting on the wrong species. Imprinting sexually
on its nest-mates would actually be harmful to the para-
site’s reproductive success (unless this imprinting could
be completely overwritten by the first experience with
conspecifics, which might not be possible due to other
constraints).
Synthesis with existing theory
A handful of recent mathematical models have explored
various conditions under which evolution can lead to
varying degrees of plasticity across development
[26,35,48,88,92]. We now briefly describe each of these
models and explain how they fit into our adaptive frame-
work outlined above.
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan [35] modelled develop-
ment as a constructive process, in which phenotypes
incrementally adapt to local environmental conditions.
They considered two environmental states (e.g. safe or
dangerous) with different phenotypic optima (e.g. fast-
moving versus heavily armoured). The environmental
state remained stable throughout development but was
unknown to the developing organism. The organism
started ontogeny with an inherited prior estimate of the
environmental state, which it could then update (in a
Bayesian manner; see Appendix A, additional file 1) by
sampling cues of fixed reliability. Crucially, sampling and
phenotypic specialisation were assumed to be mutually
exclusive activities; at each time step, the organism could
either adjust its phenotype in a particular direction or
sample an environmental cue. The degree of phenotype–
environment match at the end of ontogeny (which
occurred after a fixed number of time steps) determined
fitness. The model predicted a sensitive period early in
ontogeny, in which individuals sampled environmental
cues before specialising towards the most appropriate
phenotype given their information. Moreover, stochastic
sampling led to individual differences in plasticity: indivi-
duals who experienced more consistent cue sets devel-
oped more confident estimates of the environmental
state sooner and hence switched from sampling to
specialisation earlier in ontogeny, losing their plasticity at
faster rates. In terms of our conceptual framework, two
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factors explain changes in plasticity in this model
(Table 2): endogenous changes in information state (esti-
mates of the environmental state typically improve over
ontogeny) and increasing limits to plasticity (fewer phe-
notypic adjustments are possible as the end of ontogeny
approaches).
In a follow-up model, Panchanathan and Frankenhuis
[88] examined a scenario in which sampling and specia-
lisation do not trade off; instead, individuals (passively)
collect cues throughout ontogeny while building their
phenotypes. This allows the organism to continue to
change its mind while constructing its phenotype and to
switch developmental trajectories accordingly. In this
model, organisms not only accrued fitness benefits for
correct phenotypic increments (i.e. phenotypes that
matched the local environmental conditions), but also
incurred fitness penalties for incorrect increments. Just
like the earlier model [35], the new model predicted
that organisms should become less sensitive to environ-
mental cues over the course of ontogeny, and in some
cases come to ignore them entirely. The more reliable
the cues were, the faster plasticity declined. Again,
stochastic sampling generated individual differences in
sensitive windows: individuals who sampled more con-
sistent cue sets lost their plasticity earlier in ontogeny.
A novel prediction was that, in some cases, individuals
should not switch their developmental trajectories even
if they change their estimate about the most likely envir-
onmental state, because of an asymmetry in the asso-
ciated fitness returns. Perseveration might be adaptive,
for instance, if additional increments towards the origi-
nal phenotypic goal (if correct) would yield higher fit-
ness gains than initial increments towards the
alternative phenotype (if correct), even if the former
gains are less likely. Relating this model to our frame-
work (Table 2), the same two factors explain changes in
plasticity as in the model of Frankenhuis and Pancha-
nathan [35]: endogenous changes in information state
and increasing limits to plasticity.
Stamps and Krishnan [48] also modelled developmen-
tal trajectories over a fixed time period and with envir-
onmental cues of fixed reliability, but using 100 possible
environmental states rather than just two. Again, condi-
tions remained stable over ontogeny. The authors
assumed that an individual’s behavioural phenotype is
directly tied to its information state and considered how
this is influenced by different initial estimates (priors),
reflecting genetic and non-genetic information received
from ancestors at birth or hatching. The model pre-
dicted that behaviour changes most rapidly early in
ontogeny, when individuals have least information about
current environmental conditions. In terms of our fra-
mework, this heightened sensitivity to experience is
explained by endogenous changes in information state
(Table 2), with sensitivity declining gradually as indivi-
duals become better informed. The same endogenous
changes in information state also led to an increase in
the temporal consistency of behaviour over the course
of development [48].
English et al. [92], like Frankenhuis and Panchanathan
[35,88], studied optimal development in a world with
two possible environmental states (food-rich and food-
poor). Unlike other models [26,35,48,88], however, they
allowed a flexible time period for development rather
than assuming this to be fixed, and thus the constraints
on plasticity did not change over ontogeny. English
et al. explicitly modelled the process of growth, in
which phenotypic adjustment and information gain are
inextricably linked—a higher rate of food intake not
only leads to increased body size, but also increases the
posterior estimate (see Appendix A, additional file 1)
that the environment is food-rich. This coupling sets it
apart from other models in which phenotypic adjust-
ment and information gain are assumed to be either
mutually exclusive [35] or completely independent
[26,88]. In the model by English et al., individuals chose
how much to forage (under predation risk) in each time
step, which affected their probability of finding food,
Table 2. Summary of five recent mathematical evolutionary models that predict variation in plasticity across
development















N N Y N Y N
Panchanathan and Frankenhuis
[88]
N N Y N Y N
Stamps and Krishnan [48] N N Y N N N
English et al. [88] N N Y N N N
Fischer et al. [26] N N Y Y N N
Letters identify which factors did (Y) and did not (N) vary across development in each model. Factors varying across development could potentially explain the
predicted developmental changes in plasticity.
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and at what body size to mature given their current esti-
mate of the environmental conditions. The model pre-
dicted that foraging experiences early in life had a
greater effect on foraging behaviour and the timing of
maturation than similar experiences later in life, due to
a decline in uncertainty with age (Table 2).
Finally, Fischer et al. [26] modelled optimal patterns of
age-dependent plasticity in an environment where condi-
tions could fluctuate over time. As in the models by
Frankenhuis and Panchanathan [35,88] and English et al.
[92] they considered just two environmental states,
favouring alternative phenotypic specialisations. Like
Panchanathan and Frankenhuis [88] they allowed sam-
pling and specialisation to be independent: in a given
time step, the developing individual could both sample
environmental cues and adjust its phenotype. Phenotypic
adjustment was assumed to be costly but not limited, in
that the individual could potentially change its phenotype
all the way from one extreme to the other within a single
time step, but its survival and/or fecundity was reduced
by an amount proportional to the degree of change. In
contrast to the other models mentioned above the envir-
onmental conditions could change during the organism’s
lifespan, following a pattern of positive temporal autocor-
relation. A maximum lifespan was imposed but repro-
ductive success was accrued at every time step, according
to the match between the organism’s current phenotype
and the current environmental conditions. The model
predicted a peak in plasticity at the start of development,
followed by a fat tail of moderate plasticity extending
into later life if the probability of environmental change
was sufficiently high. These patterns are explained pri-
marily by endogenous changes in information state
(Table 2): in a relatively stable environment the develop-
ing individual gradually becomes better informed, but
when conditions are more changeable this generates
additional uncertainty that can favour prolonged plasti-
city. Another contributing factor was that the value of
information declined across the lifespan in the model,
due to a mortality risk in each time step that discounted
the value of future reproductive gains (Table 2).
The summary in Table 2 clearly shows that the focus
of these adaptive models has been on endogenous
changes in information state—a common factor to all
the models is that individuals typically become better
informed over the course of development (see also [93]
for analogous effects in a model of language acquisi-
tion). Specific models have also incorporated declining
fitness benefits of information [26] and increasing limits
to plasticity [35,88]. To our knowledge, no models of
adaptive developmental plasticity have addressed
changes in the frequency of cues, exogenous changes in
cue reliability or changing costs of plasticity as possible
underlying factors. This would be a valuable direction
for future work.
Conclusions
Key points and future directions
We have used an information-based perspective, focus-
ing on uncertainty and informativeness as the key evolu-
tionary drivers of plasticity, to identify adaptive reasons
why individuals may be more or less sensitive to envir-
onmental cues at different points in development.
Previous work has shown that plasticity is favoured
when organisms are uncertain about the environmental
conditions but can reduce that uncertainty through
informative cues received during development. This
offers a useful framework to understand differences in
plasticity both between populations [28,31,66] and
between individuals in a single population [23,36,48,78].
Here, we have used the same principles to address
changes in plasticity across the lifetime of a single indi-
vidual (Fig. 1). Broadly speaking, sensitive windows are
more likely when organisms are uncertain about envir-
onmental conditions, receive many informative cues, are
unconstrained in adjusting their phenotypes and fitness
depends strongly on the phenotype–environment match.
Optimality models have highlighted endogenous
changes in information state as an important adaptive
explanation for changes in plasticity across development
(Table 2). In relatively stable environments, if individuals
face a more or less constant stream of information
about the environmental conditions (i.e. constant fre-
quency and reliability of cues), they should become
increasingly certain about those conditions as they age
and gain experience [35,48], which will favour a decline
in plasticity across the lifespan. That is, all else being
equal, phenotypic development should be most sensitive
to experiences early in life. As we have discussed above,
there are other factors—including ontogenetic changes
in the benefits, costs and constraints associated with
phenotypic adjustments—that will alter this pattern.
However, we propose that an age-dependent decline in
plasticity is the appropriate null expectation from an
information-based perspective, and certainly a more sen-
sible expectation than constant, age-independent plasti-
city. There is some empirical support for this pattern, in
terms of increasing repeatability of behaviour with age
[48,64,65]. In cases where plasticity follows a different
developmental trajectory, and especially if there is evi-
dence for heightened plasticity later in life, we encou-
rage researchers to examine these patterns through the
lens of our conceptual framework to identify underlying
ecological or developmental factors.
Fundamentally, adaptive developmental plasticity is
shaped by the interaction between the statistical properties
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of the environment (e.g. the timescale of variability in con-
ditions, the degree of autocorrelation and the noisiness of
environmental cues) and the organism’s life history
[24,29,32,60]. It is this interaction that determines both
how uncertain the organism is about the environmental
conditions at the relevant stage of its life, and to what
extent its experiences during development reduce this
uncertainty. For contexts in which the optimal phenotype
depends on easily measurable properties of the physical
environment (e.g. water temperature) it might be straight-
forward to characterise the statistical structure of the
environment, or more specifically to obtain ‘quantitative
estimates of environmental predictability in the field over
the space and time scales relevant to the life history of the
study organism’ ([29]). In principle these estimates can
then be used to predict patterns of adaptive developmental
plasticity.
For many other contexts, however, making predictions
is likely to be more difficult. This is particularly the case
for social aspects of the environment, such as the mix-
ture of behavioural types in a population. Here, the
interplay between the environmental structure and
the organism’s behavioural phenotype is complex,
because the social environment both influences and
arises from the behavioural strategies adopted by indivi-
duals in the population. For making clear predictions
about how plasticity should vary across development in
such social contexts, mathematical and computational
models are invaluable tools. Existing models of adaptive
developmental plasticity have taken an individual opti-
misation approach in which the environmental condi-
tions are unaffected by the organism’s phenotype
[26,35,48,88,92]; developing related models for game-
theoretical situations is a key challenge for the future.
Another priority for theoretical work should be to exam-
ine how predictions derived from Bayesian models are
constrained by their assumptions regarding environmen-
tal variation. Most models of adaptive developmental
plasticity consider just two possible states of the world
(e.g. [26,35,88,92], but the predictions from models
allowing more than two states (e.g. [48]) may differ in
important ways (see ‘Endogenous changes in information
state’, above). Such differences require further attention.
We have identified several adaptive reasons why nat-
ural selection can result in developmental mechanisms
that produce sensitive windows. Further work may
reveal other possible explanations, adaptive or non-
adaptive, that are important for understanding variation
in plasticity across the lifespan. Ultimately, the field
would benefit from a comprehensive framework specify-
ing the different reasons why sensitive periods exist and
their key predictions, which can then be tested empiri-
cally. Here we have sketched out parts of that frame-
work. To the extent that development can be viewed as
a process of ontogenetic adaptation, whereby organisms
living in variable environments tailor their phenotypes
to suit the particular conditions they encounter, an
explicitly information-based perspective can yield impor-
tant insights.
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